The recent claim that gain discount rates are higher than loss rates is reexamined using the intertemporal choice paradigm developed in Loewenstein (1988 
.
For example:
• If discount rates are substantially higher for short delays than for longer time frames, a decision maker may prefer option A from Set 1, but option B from Set 2, below (Thaler, 1981) Monday arrives, his plan is no longer optimal and must be changed.
• If a decision maker's utility values depend on outcome timing (in the sense of a particular date, x) as well as on outcome kind and quantity (x) and time distance (t) , his implied discount function will not decrease monotonically in t over all delay lengths:
A decision maker may have positive utility for both mineral water (x) and champagne (x') and may generally prefer mineral water (u(x,t,T) = 10 > u(x',t,x) = 5), except on New Year's Eve (x') when she prefers champagne (u(x,t,x') = 10 < u(x',t,x') = 15 (Loewenstein, 1988) .
Clearly, some intertemporal inconsistencies can be predicted from particular discounting patterns.
Because different discounting patterns lead to different choices, the ability to predict choices depends both on the reliability of the patterns detected and on the care with which experimental conditions are defined and results interpreted. Recent laboratory studies have revealed several consistent discounting patterns. Stevenson's (1986) work shows that decision makers tend to use a ratio discounting model, which is consistent with the standard approach, but discount rate estimates from other studies reveal rates that tend to vary inversely with both time distance and absolute outcome magnitude, which is not consistent with the standard approach (Thaler, 1981 ; Benzion et al., 1989) . Thaler (1981) (Koopmans, 1960, p.306 ; see also Koopmans, Diamond, & Williamson, 1964 : Diamond, 1965 Koopmans, 1986) .
In general, individual rates of time preference are independent of market interest rates and discount functions may depend on outcome magnitudes and on outcome timing (other than time distance). But such dependencies can lead to inconsistent and suboptimal economic choices (Strotz, 1955 (1988, p. 205 (Loewenstein, 1988) . A little effort shows that the objective value of the delay premium is g Loewenstein (1988) Figure 4 Loewenstein's (1988) results show that:
1.
Delaying desirable consumption produces a subjective loss condition, In an earlier study of discounting patterns, Thaler (1981) Thaler (1981) Figure 5 Anrx)unts between $15 and $3,000 were stated in the question, so the immediate positive outcome value was given. Loss amounts were between $15 and $250. The rates shown in Figure 5 are averaged over receipt or payment magnitudes using only those absolute magnitudes that the two outcome signs had in common . Benzion et al. (1989) conclude from these estimates that "discount rates ... are smaller for losses than for gains" (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 282 The hypotheses tested were the classical (standard) approach, a market segmentation approach, the one-period implicit risk (OPR) approach and an added compensation (AC) approach. Their results support txDth "an implicit risk hypothesis . . . and an added compensation hypothesis (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 270) . The implicit risk hypothesis asserts that individuals will demand (pay) a premium to compensate the added uncertainty associated with future receipts (payments). The added compensation hypothesis "asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position" (Benzion et al., 1989, p.270 (Loewenstein, 1988 The model assumes the same discount factor, 5(t), across outcome signs. Letting 5(t) =
(1 + r)-^and assuming r = r', it is clear that
because -v(-x) > v(x) when the negative portion of the value function is steeper. But if the value function assumed is v(-x) = -x and v(x) = x, for rate computation purposes, when the true value function has -v(-x) > v(x), then
will result in estimated rates r and r' such that r < r'. The estimated discount rates r and r' capture both time discounting and the effect of differing gain and loss slopes. If both outcome signs are (time) discounted at the same rate and have the same slope, then r = r'.
If on average subjects exhibit the sort of value functions Loewenstein's theory assumes, then, unless some procedure is used to assess or estimate the values v(x), a rate discrepancy across subjective loss and gain scenarios should always appear and (H9) subjective loss scenarios (delayed receipts and expedited payments) should always generate higher implied rates than subjective gain scenarios (delayed payments and expedited receipts), (H10) neutral scenarios will also produce a rate discrepancy across receipts and payments, the payment rate should be higher, and (H11) the difference should be smaller than the difference between subjective gain and loss rates for the delay frames, but equal to or greater than the difference between the subjective gain and loss rates for the expedite frame. The greater the adjustment (up to x), the smaller the difference. 
Design
The design included four within-subject factors, outcome sign (two levels), frame (three levels -delay, neutral, and expedite), time (four levels -six months, one year, two years, and four years), and amount (four levels -$40, $200, $1000, and $5000).
Crossing sign with frame creates the six scenarios investigated. Four of these (delayed receipts (A), delayed payments (B), expedited receipts (C), and expedited payments (D)) were investigated by Benzion et al. (1989) . Two scenarios, neutral receipts (E), and neutral payments (F) .1289
'The probability values shown were computed using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon Table 1 The sign x frame interaction is highly significant, however, indicating a strong effect for scenarios A through F. Figure 9 , a plot of the sign by frame interaction, shows why. 
